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Astropolítica

"Se se pudessem interrogar as estrelas perguntar-lhes-ia se as maçam mais os astrónomos ou os poetas." Pitigrilli

Astropolítica

"Se se pudessem interrogar as estrelas perguntar-lhes-ia se as maçam mais os astrónomos ou os poetas." Pitigrilli

Assuring Space Support Despite ASATs

Janeiro 30, 2008

Vera Gomes

ssuring Space Support Despite ASATs

by Robert Butterworth
January 1, 2008

A year ago, China destroyed one of its own satellites in a test of an anti-satellite system (ASAT). This test prompted sharp commentary and numerous recommendations on how to react. A year later the direction of the U.S. response remains shrouded in the mists of classified programs and secret information. Nevertheless, the public defense budget offers some glimpses of priorities at the highest level. Creation of a major force program and increased funding for situational awareness activities were the main priorities expressed in the FY 2008 defense appropriations bill (see http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=566 for more details).

In a new Policy Outlook, Dr. Robert Butterworth, President of Aries Analytics and a Fellow at the George Marshall Institute, summarizes the responses available to the U.S. and concludes that providing supplemental capability to meet surging needs and to replace lost or failed sensors ranks as a foremost priority amongst those options.

He goes on to outline how this supplemental capability might be provided. Each of the options will require trade-offs between cost, capability, and speed of response. Butterworth argues: Within each option there are competing priorities; in pursuit of rapid augmentation, for example, one can find demands for new industrial practices, common aero vehicles, reusable upper stages, and new launch site developments. But if priorities are set by military needs, surely an initial operational capability takes precedence.

(artigo completo em: http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/575.pdf)

The Stars of China’s Space Program: The Rise of a “Space Gang”?

Janeiro 30, 2008

Vera Gomes

By Kevin Pollpeter

Since 2001, China’s space program has received increasing attention in both budgetary allocations and technological accomplishments. More recently, the rise of China’s space program has been highlighted by the appointments of career space professionals to positions of importance in China’s weapons development bureaucracy. In fact, career space professionals will now occupy the head position at the Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) and four out of the eight top positions at the General Armaments Department (GAD) [1].

On August 30, Zhang Qingwei, General Manager of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), was promoted to the post of minister of the COSTIND. Zhang, 46, is one of the youngest ministers to have ever been appointed in the People’s Republic of China. In 2006, another career space insider, Huang Zuoxing, was promoted to the position of deputy political commissar of the GAD. Huang’s promotion was preceded in 2002 by the appointment of the former deputy political commissar of the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center, Chi Wanchun, to the position of political commissar of the GAD. Two other deputy commanders of the GAD also have space careers. Zhang Jianqi, appointed to the GAD in 2004, has served most of his career at China’s launch facilities and Zhu Fazhong, appointed to the GAD in 2002, appears to have spent the majority of his career in the missile and radar fields. Zhang Qingwei, Chi Wanchun, Zhang Jianqi, and Zhu Fazhong are also members of the important Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

The promotion of career space professionals to positions of prominence in China’s military industrial complex may signal the increasing influence of the program in Chinese decision-making on weapons development. Such influence could help explain China’s decision to develop counterspace capabilities and the increasing attention that is being paid to the development of space-based C4ISR assets and China’s space program overall. For the future, the rise of China’s career space professionals to national-level decision-making positions could help China expand its position as a major space power.

Zhang Qingwei [2]

Zhang’s appointment as the minister of COSTIND follows a string of successes in China’s space industry where he was repeatedly called upon to rescue ailing projects. As general manager of CASC, Zhang has managed the most important sectors of China’s space industry during its most successful period of performance.

Official biographies describe Zhang as the wunderkind of China’s space industry. Born on November 7, 1961 in Hebei Province, Zhang graduated from the Northwest Polytechnical University (NPU) in 1982. After graduation, he was employed at the 603 Institute, where he designed aircraft tails. In a short time, he was promoted to director of the engineering department, but after three years at the institute, he returned to NPU to get his masters degree. After graduation in 1988, he joined the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT), China’s largest and most important launch vehicle manufacturer, in its overall system design department.

Zhang’s first claim to fame occurred in January 1989 while at CALT. At that time, the U.S. satellite manufacturer Hughes had contracted CASC to launch the Asiasat-1 satellite on a Long March rocket. This was the first time that the Long March had been used to launch a foreign satellite and Hughes required the satellite to be separated from the launcher only after it has stopped spinning, a technique not yet mastered by China’s space industry. During discussions about Hughes’ requirements, Zhang, then a junior engineer, proposed a method using computer modeling. CALT management quickly endorsed the method and, as one article puts it, Zhang “in one fell swoop went from being in the reserves to being part of the shock troops.” Just 10 months later, Zhang’s plan was accepted by Hughes and on April 7, 1990, the Asiasat-1 satellite was successfully launched from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center. Even though Zhang did not officially qualify for promotion, CALT bent the rules and promoted Zhang to senior engineer based on this performance.

Having proven himself, Zhang was placed in charge of the foundering Long March-2 (LM-2) rocket program, which was in danger of running over budget and behind schedule. With just 40 days left before the contract expired, Zhang and two others were able to conclude the project and on July 16, 1990 the first Long March 2 rocket successfully lifted off.

After the success of the Long March 2, Zhang was put in charge of more than 30 other engineers to determine the suitability of the LM-2 for the human spaceflight program and given three main tasks: to improve reliability indicators, guarantee astronaut safety and the adaptability of the space capsule, and write a technology improvement and feasibility report. When the human space flight project was approved on September 21, 1991, Zhang was appointed the deputy general engineer for the LM-2F and became the youngest deputy engineer in the Chinese aviation and space industries. In this capacity, Zhang personally wrote the “Long March 2F Design Criteria” which governed the entire stage of the research and development process.

The year 1996 was devastating for China’s space industry. In that year, CALT suffered two launch failures: a LM-3B in February and a LM-3 in August. The failures were the death knell for China’s commercial launch industry and the subsequent controversy over the U.S. industry handling of the failures would lead to convictions involving export control violations and recriminations of Chinese spying. In August 1996, Zhang was again asked to fill the breech and was named deputy director of CALT and placed in charge of the next launch of the LM-3 and, above all, putting China’s launch industry back on track. Zhang committed his team to quality and on May 12, 1997, a Dongfanghong-3 (DFH-3) communications satellite was successfully launched.

In July 1999, Zhang was promoted to deputy general manager of CASC and a member of the leading Communist Party organization within CASC. During the next two years, China would successfully launch two experimental Shenzhou capsules. Upon becoming deputy general manager, Zhang set about making the corporation more profitable. He did this in part by emphasizing technological and organizational innovations and introducing information technology into the production process. Through these efforts, it is said that many people who had left the space industry returned.

In December 2001, Zhang was promoted to general manager and party general secretary of CASC. At the same time, he was also promoted to be the deputy commander of the human spaceflight program. In November 2002, Zhang’s political fortunes increased when he became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, one of the most important Communist Party organizations in China.

It is easy to attribute Zhang’s exploits to the hagiography that often accompanies biographies of official personages in the Chinese press, but there is no doubt that Zhang’s quick rise through government and party ranks has been due to his stellar performance. Through his leadership of CASC and its subsidiary organizations, Zhang has been responsible for driving the Chinese space industry’s most impressive performance ever. Under its subsidiary CALT, CASC successfully conducted 61 straight launches of the Long March rocket since 1996, raising its reliability to 94 percent, a success rate equivalent to other international carriers. Moreover, China has launched more satellites and more different types of satellites than at any other time in its history. CASC’s subsidiary, the China Academy of Spaceflight Technology (CAST), builds the majority of China’s satellites, including the DFH, Sinosat, and Zhongxing communication satellites, the Beidou navigation and positioning satellite, recoverable satellites, the Ziyuan earth resources satellite, the Haiyang ocean surveillance satellites, and the Shenzhou manned space capsule. China has also been able to sign the first-ever contracts for the export of satellites to Nigeria and Venezuela and for the first time in six years, conducted a commercial launch of a satellite in 2005. Moreover, China completed testing of its human spaceflight program and launched two manned spaceflights. Only one failure has marred an otherwise flawless performance: the solar panels of a Sinosat-2 launched in October 2006 failed to open properly causing the loss of the satellite.
These accomplishments have earned Zhang a number of awards. In 1991, he was selected as one of the top ten young science workers in the space industry; in 1999, he was recognized as one of the top 10 outstanding young people in China; and in 2003, he was the CCTV businessperson of the year [3].

Chi Wanchun [4]

General Chi Wanchun was born in 1946 in Shandong Province, joined the PLA in 1965, and was enrolled in the Harbin Military Engineering Academy until 1970. Chi’s first assignment after graduation was at the Weinan Satellite Training Station in Shaanxi Province where he studied the application of computer technology to observing and controlling satellites. He then went on to serve in a series of leadership positions in China’s Telemetry, Tracking, and Control (TT&C) network. He has served as the political commissar of the Kashgar Satellite Observation and Control Center, the political commissar of the Minxi Satellite Observation and Control Center, and deputy political commissar of the Xichang Satellite Launch Center. He also served a tour as the political commissar of the COSTIND logistics department. In 1990, he was appointed deputy political commissar of the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center. This was followed in 1997 by a promotion to be deputy director of the political department of COSTIND. For a short time in 1999, Chi was the director of the political department of the GAD until he was promoted to the political commissar position of the National Defense University of Science and Technology, a school heavily involved in weapons development and research. In October 2002, he was elected to the Central Committee and was promoted to political commissar of the GAD.

Huang Zuoxing [5]

General Huang Zuoxing is the current deputy political commissar of GAD. He was born in 1948 in Shaanxi Province and joined the Army in 1968. He received an undergraduate correspondence degree from the Economic Management Department of the Central Party School. He was political commissar of the Taiyuan Satellite Launching Center and assumed the office of deputy political commissar of the GAD in August 2006.

Zhang Jianqi [6]

Lieutenant General Zhang Jianqi is a deputy commander of GAD. He was born in March 1946 in Shandong Province. In 1970, he graduated from the Harbin Military Engineering College with a degree in nuclear physics. After graduation, he served tours at the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center and the Xichang Satellite Center. After these appointments, he served as the department head of COSTIND’s testing department. In 1997, he became the deputy director of the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center and became its head in 2001. In 2004, he became a deputy director of the GAD and a member of the Central Committee.

Zhu Fazhong [7]

Lieutenant General Zhu Fazhong was born in May 1948 in Anhui Province and is a graduate of Beijing University with a degree in computational mathematics. Zhu, who joined the PLA in 1969, is not strictly a space professional and it appears that much of his career has been in the missile field. From 1969 to 1993, he served at multiple testing bases. In 1993, he was the commander of a test facility involved in launch telemetry and in 1994, he was involved in a test facility working on mobile radar. In 1999, he was the commander of a testing base and in 2002, he was promoted to be deputy director of the GAD. In 2002, he was appointed an alternate member of the Central Committee.

Analysis

The promotion of five space professionals to prominent positions within China’s military industrial complex may shed light on the direction of China’s military modernization, the nature of advancement in the government and military, and China’s future leadership. These people are now in key positions to influence the direction of Chinese military hardware development. Indeed, the appointments suggest the rise of a “hangtian bang” or “space gang” within China’s military-industrial complex that could shape policy for years to come.

At a macro-level, the appointments appear to reinforce the PLA’s commitment to making it a high-technology force capable of fighting and winning informationized wars. More specifically, the appointments also suggest that the PLA’s commitment to space is increasing. While more attention has been focused on China’s space program after the January 11 anti-satellite test, China also appears committed to building a robust space-based C4ISR system. As one author writes, “Recent high technology local wars have shown: space weapon systems, whether at the strategic or tactical levels, cannot be removed from modern operations and have an increasingly important role in no-contact warfare” [8].

The promotion of career space professionals may also indicate that China’s commitment to expanding its role as a major space power will continue, not only for military space programs but also for its more controversial lunar and human spaceflight programs. The presence of a group of space professionals in top decision-making positions also gives credence to a bureaucratic politics model for China’s decision to develop counterspace capabilities. According to one report, these five individuals are all proponents of establishing an experimental space warfare unit [9]. Such leadership in the past has proven critical with major scientific and engineering programs. The human spaceflight program faced major opposition until leading scientists appealed directly to Deng Xiaoping for his approval [10]. Likewise, the Three Gorges Dam project received significant opposition from the National People’s Congress and was only approved because of Li Peng’s personal efforts.

These appointments also suggest something about paths to promotion in the Communist Party. Much research has focused on the role of factions within the promotion process. For example, there has been conjecture that the promotion of Chi Wanchun was due in part to his close relationship to the former minister of national defense, Chi Haotian (no relation). After his promotion, Chi Wanchun could have filled subsequent GAD openings with other space colleagues. However, it is also evident that individual qualifications do play a role. While data on the other cadres profiled here is too sparse for effective analysis, the case of Zhang Qingwei illustrates that achievement can also guarantee success in the Communist Party.

Finally, the careers of these individuals may continue. It is rumored that Zhang Qingwei is being groomed for higher positions [11]. Indeed, it can be argued that Zhang could have more of an effect on China’s space industry by remaining at CASC instead of at COSTIND where he will have less tactical influence over the development of weapon systems. Clearly, the advancement of Zhang Qingwei has more to do with his outstanding success as a manager rather than simply serving as a space professional.

While it is ordinary for top ranking officials to have municipal or provincial experience, the current premier, Wen Jiabao, had no such experience and rose up through the ranks of the Ministry of Land and Resources and the General Office of the Central Committee. Zhang’s next appointment should be telling since it will most likely involve a position outside of the military industrial complex. In regards to the military members of the space gang, the current head of the GAD, Chen Bingde, has spent most of his career in operations and it would not be unreasonable to consider a career armaments officer, like the ones profiled here, to replace him.

Conclusion

The origins of the space gang are unknown, with their formation possibly the result of direction from the top leadership of the PLA or simply due to serendipitous conditions. It is also possible that the PLA’s commitment to building an informationized force led to the selection of individuals highly competent in advanced technologies. In this case, careers in the space program have made them uniquely qualified to serve in these roles. Finally, institutional factionalism may have also played a role. Whatever the reason, the influence of the space gang may be felt for many years to come as China’s space program grows in numbers and complexity.

Notes

1. COSTIND and GAD form two parts of China’s three part military industrial complex, with the third being the defense industries. COSTIND is a governmental organization under the State Council responsible for coordinating weapon and equipment development between the defense industry and the military. GAD is a military organization under the CMC responsible for weapons and equipment development and procurement. Officially, GAD presents its requirements to COSTIND, who then coordinates with the defense industries to meet the requirements. In practice, there is an overlap between the two organizations and no clear-cut delineation of powers.
2. Unless otherwise noted, this section is taken from Yu Xing, “Zhang Qingwei Becomes the Youngest Minister Who Previously Strengthened the International Prestige of China’s Space Program (Zhang qingwei chengwei zui nianqing buzhang ceng liwan zhongguo hangtian guoji shengyu),” Qianlong.com, September 1, 2007.
3. Zhang Qingwei, Together Innovating a Brilliant China Space Program (Gongchuang zhongguo hangtian xin huihuang),” China Scholars Abroad (Shenzhou xueren), May 2005, p. 17.
4. Unless otherwise noted, this is section taken from Chin Chien-li, “The CPC’s Key Figure for Combating Taiwan: A Commentary and Profile of Chi Wanchun, Political Commissar of the General Armament Department (Zhonggong dui tai zuozhan zhongjian renwu zongzhuangbeibu zhengwei chi wanchun jiangjun pingfu),” Chien Shao, September 1, 2006, pp. 58-61.
5. "Huang Zuoxing Promoted to Deputy Political Commissar of PLA General Armament Department (Huang Zuoxing Sheng Zong Zhuangbeibu fu zhengwei)", Ta Kung Pao, August 31, 2006.
6. “Leadership Organization (Lingdao xulie), www.plaaf.net.
7. “Leadership Organization (Lingdao xulie), www.plaaf.net.
8. Pan Changpeng, Gu Wenjin, and Chen Jie, “Analysis of the Capabilities of Military Satellite Support of Anti-ship Missiles in Offensive and Defensive Operations (Junshi weixing dui fanchuan daodangongfang zuozhan de zhiyuan nengli fenxi),” Winged Missile Journal (Feihang daodan), May 2006, p. 12.
9. Chin Chien-li, “The CPC’s Key Figure for Combating Taiwan: A Commentary and Profile of Chi Wanchun, Political Commissar of the General Armament Department (Zhonggong dui tai zuozhan zhongjian renwu zongzhuangbeibu zhengwei chi wanchun jiangjun pingfu),” Chien Shao, September 1, 2006, p. 59.
10. “The Highest Leader Has The Final Say (Zuigaoceng lingdao paiban),” China Space News (Zhongguo hangtian bao), October 16, 2003, p. P34.
11. "5th Generation Elite Who Will Be Responsible for China in the Future," Sentaku, March 1, 2005, p. 34.


(in http://jamestown.org/china_brief/article.php?articleid=2373661)

Antrix Launches Israeli Satellite Using Commercial PSLV Rocket

Janeiro 22, 2008

Vera Gomes

The Indian Space Research Organization's Antrix Corporation has successfully launched an Israeli spy satellite using its second full-scale commercial mission of the PSLV launcher.

The PSLV-C10 blasted off from the First Launch Pad (FLP) at the SDSC SHAR spaceport at 09:15 Hrs with the ignition of the first stage. This was the 25th Satellite Launch Mission from SDSC, SHAR.

The launch of TECSAR was executed under a commercial contract between Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and ANTRIX Corporation.

The first major commercial launch of a PSLV vehicle (PSLV-C8) took place on April 23, 2007, when India successfully launched the Italian astronomical satellite, AGILE.

The 300 kg Israeli spy satellite TECSAR was placed into its intended orbit with a perigee of 450 km and apogee of 580 km with an orbital inclination of 41 deg with respect to the equator. TECSAR was in orbit 1,185 seconds after lift off.

PSLV has emerged as the workhorse launch vehicle of ISRO with eleven consecutively successful flights so far.

Since its first successful launch in 1994, PSLV has launched eight Indian remote sensing satellites, an amateur radio satellite, HAMSAT, a recoverable space capsule, SRE-1, and two primary satellites and six small satellites for foreign customers.

In addition, the PSLV was used to launch India's domestic designed and built weather satellite, Kalpana-1, into Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO). PSLV is also slated to launch India's first spacecraft to moon, Chandrayaan-1, in 2008.

TECSAR is a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) Technology satellite. The design, development and fabrication activities of the satellite were led by MBT Space, a division of the Israeli Aerospace industries with the participation of other high tech industries such as ELTA, Tadiran Spectralink, Rafael.

The satellite is equipped with a SAR payload with the capability to see through the clouds and carry out day and night all weather imaging of friend and foe with particular emphasis upon regional adversaries such as Iran that many believe to be building a nuclear weapons program.

(in http://www.space-travel.com/reports/PSLV_Launches_Israeli_Satellite_999.html)

Concurso “Descobre o teu céu” - Museus da Ciência desafiam alunos a criar constelações de estrelas

Janeiro 22, 2008

Vera Gomes

Os alunos do ensino básico serão desafiados, ao longo deste ano, a criar constelações de estrelas, no âmbito do concurso “Descobre o teu céu”, promovido pelos museus da Ciência da Universidade de Coimbra e de Lisboa.

A iniciativa, que conta ainda com a Critical Software na promoção, insere-se no âmbito do programa de Celebração do Ano Internacional da Astronomia, assinalado em 2009.

Para “cultivar o gosto dos mais novos pela Astronomia”, a organização do concurso propõe “aos alunos de todas as escolas realizarem, a partir de quatro mapas, um desenho de novas constelações e uma narrativa”.

“A partir das estrelas de certas partes do céu que foram seleccionadas, inspirados na observação do céu real e/ou do céu de um planetário, ou simplesmente a partir de uma representação das estrelas numa imagem, pretende-se que os alunos construam novas constelações e desenvolvam histórias a elas associadas”, revela a organização.

As inscrições estão abertas até 30 de Novembro de 2008, e os trabalhos aceites até 21 de Dezembro de 2008.

O júri irá escolher os melhores trabalhos de cada escalão, que serão reunidos num livro a publicar em 2009. A obra será distribuída por todos os Agrupamentos de Escolas do país.

Os resultados do concurso, no qual podem participar equipas de cinco a 20 alunos e acompanhados por um professor, serão anunciados a 21 de Março de 2009.

O PÚBLICO.PT associa-se a esta iniciativa através da divulgação na sua página principal de um link para os regulamentos e página web do concurso, a ser disponibilizado nos momentos-chave do concurso: lançamento do concurso, apresentação dos resultados, divulgação da lista dos premiados.

(in http://ultimahora.publico.clix.pt/noticia.aspx?id=1316965)

A agência espacial americana quer desenvolver um MMO.

Janeiro 21, 2008

Vera Gomes

A NASA anda em busca de parceiros com vista ao desenvolvimento de MMO. De acordo com a proposta da agência espacial, o jogo servirá de ferramenta de instrução e treino para possíveis futuros colaboradores.

“A NASA tem condições para criar um jogo online que funcione como (…) um laboratório, uma ferramenta de visualização massiva e espaço de trabalho de equipa, oferecendo simultaneamente uma experiência de jogo estimulante“, pode ler-se no documento.

O organismo acredita que os adeptos de MMOs desenvolvem aptidões associadas a uma carreira ligada à ciência e à tecnologia e que combinar puzzles e acção poderá ajudar a formar profissionais em menos tempos que os programas convencionais.

“Os MMOs ajudam os jogadores a desenvolver e treinar capacidades exigidas pelos funcionários de hoje. Estas incluem raciocínio estratégico, análise interpretativa, resolução de problemas, formulação e execução de planos, trabalho de equipa e adaptação a mudanças rápidas”, explica a NASA.

Entre as tarefas possíveis estarão o lidar com “reacções químicas em organismos vivos, a operação e reparação de equipamentos dispendiosos e a experiência da microgravidade”, tarefas estas que executadas virtualmente tornarão, de acordo com a agência, lidar com conceitos complexos e transferir, rapidamente, a teoria para a prática.

(in: http://gameover.sapo.pt/article.html?id=37031)

China's Anti-Satellite Test: One Year Later - Troubling Aftermath

Janeiro 14, 2008

Vera Gomes

Newswise — One year ago today, China intentionally destroyed its own aging weather spacecraft making use of an anti-satellite (ASAT) device, creating in the process the most prolific amount of orbital debris in five decades of worldwide space activities.

That lingering cloud of dangerous space junk from the Chinese ASAT is a wake-up call, one that all nations engaged in utilizing space should heed, observed Ray Williamson, Executive Director of the Secure World Foundation.

“The harmful environmental effects of the Chinese ASAT test point out the need for the space faring nations of the world to come together in developing effective rules for the governance of space activities,” Williamson said.

The consequence of the January 11, 2007 ASAT destruction by China of its defunct, eight year old Fengyun-1C meteorological satellite, Williamson added, signals a requirement for action on several fronts.

“We need an international cooperative approach to space situational awareness, space traffic management and an international agreement banning further ASAT tests,” Williamson noted.

Put in harm’s way by the debris cloud of Earth-circling satellite fragments are billions of dollars of operational satellites in the service of numerous nations, as well as the International Space Station and its crew. In one reported instance, Williamson observed, NASA had to execute a collision-avoidance maneuver with its Terra Earth-monitoring spacecraft to evade a piece of debris from the Chinese ASAT test.

Reducing the threat

NASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office at the space agency’s Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas has stated that the cloud of clutter from the ASAT test “represents the single worst contamination of low Earth orbit during the past 50 years.”

A recent NASA analysis of ASAT-produced space junk yielded by China’s purposeful destruction of its nearly one-ton meteorological satellite – chunks of litter one centimeter and greater – is estimated at roughly 150,000 bits or more of orbiting flotsam produced immediately after the test.

Furthermore, only a small percentage of the spacecraft wreckage has reentered the Earth’s atmosphere. The majority of the debris was thrown into long-duration orbits, with lifetimes measured in decades - even centuries.

“Despite the problems the Chinese test has created for satellites in orbit, perhaps something good can come out of the test in the form of an increased awareness of the threat to space systems from orbital debris and the need to reduce that threat,” Williamson said.

“In fact, in my view, the Chinese test generally increases the incentive to craft and adopt internationally acceptable ‘rules of the road’ for space, with the goals of not only reducing the threat of damage from orbital debris, but also assisting all countries in establishing and maintaining relatively safe access to space,” Williamson said.

Explained Cynda Collins Arsenault, President and co-founder of the Secure World Foundation: “Although China has been rather silent in commenting on the test, and there are multiple speculations as to the purpose, China in conjunction with Russia continues to push for a treaty preventing the weaponization of space in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament.”

The vision of the Secure World Foundation (SWF) is to promote secure, sustainable and enforceable agreements that preserve and protect the global space commons. The SWF calls for international steps toward establishing effective governance of space, curbing the spread of orbital debris while encouraging space traffic management, and cultivating the opportunity to utilize space for the benefit of all humankind.

(in: http://www.newswise.com/articles/view/536853/)

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  1. 2006
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  4. M
  5. A
  6. M
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  8. J
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  11. O
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  1. 2005
  2. J
  3. F
  4. M
  5. A
  6. M
  7. J
  8. J
  9. A
  10. S
  11. O
  12. N
  13. D
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