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Astropolítica

"Se se pudessem interrogar as estrelas perguntar-lhes-ia se as maçam mais os astrónomos ou os poetas." Pitigrilli

Astropolítica

"Se se pudessem interrogar as estrelas perguntar-lhes-ia se as maçam mais os astrónomos ou os poetas." Pitigrilli

Agência de Defesa de Mísseis quer rastrear mísseis e vigiar o Espaço

Agosto 03, 2015

Vera Gomes

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency has said the follow-on program to its missile tracking Space Tracking and Surveillance System (above) is likely to be one part for a multi-mission Defense Department satellite.Crédito: Missil Defense Agency

 

A Agência de Defesa de Mísseis americana propõe uma constelação de satélites para realizar rastreamento de mísseis e vigilância do espaço. Um funcionário da agência disse na semana passada que há "um desejo" por várias partes do Departamento de Defesa para cooperar numa constelação de satélites na órbita baixa da Terra que iria realizar várias missões. A agência também confirmou que adjudicou um contrato com uma operadora de satélite comercial - sem mencionar o nome mas que se pensa ser a Iridium - para hospedar cargas úteis para um sistema que confirme se um míssil foi interceptado com sucesso.

 

Podem ler mais sobre este tópico aqui.

Obama dá 168 milhões para escudo antimíssil

Agosto 05, 2014

Vera Gomes

 

Obama dá 168 milhões para escudo antimíssil

 

 

 

O Presidente norte-americano assinou segunda-feira a lei que permite gastar o equivalente a 168 milhões de euros para manter a capacidade do sistema antimíssil "Iron Dome" de Israel, que diminuiu a capacidade do Hamas de atingir o território israelita.

 

"Os Estados Unidos estão satisfeitos pelo facto do "Iron Dome", desenvolvido conjuntamente com Israel e financiado pelos Estados Unidos, terem salvado incontáveis vidas em Israel", disse Josh Earnest, porta-voz da Casa Branca, em comunicado.

 

O porta-voz acrescentou também que o apoio ao sistema antimíssil assegura que Israel "manterá esta defesa vital contra os morteiros e artilharia à luz das ameaças".

 

(retirado daqui)

Space-based missile defense and the psychology of warfare

Setembro 09, 2008

Vera Gomes

by Taylor Dinerman
Monday, September 8, 2008

Anyone who wants to understand the way our enemies really think, as well as how and why we fail to grasp their reality should read Kevin Woods recent book The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War published by the Naval Institute Press. It tell the story of the 1991 Gulf War from the Iraqi point of view based largely on captured documents and published Arabic sources. The most important point in this study is that, from Saddam’s point of view, as well as that of the Ba’athist leadership, they won. After all, in spite of being ignominiously kicked out of Kuwait and having their armies thoroughly defeated on the battlefield, they remained in power. Political power was the only thing that counted and they had been able to keep it.

 

One of the keys to their belief that they won was that they were able to launch dozens of long-range missiles at their enemies, especially at Israel. They believed that the boost that this gave them, at home and in the Arab world, somehow compensated for everything that happened on the battlefield in Kuwait and southern Iraq.

 

Looking back on the German V-2 campaign against London and Antwerp, the greatest military effect was not the physical and psychological damage done to England and Belgium, but the impact on Germany’s national morale.

In his autobiography It Doesn’t Take A Hero Norman Schwarzkopf wrote that “…in essence what they had was a weapon that could fly 300 miles and miss the target by a couple of miles with a warhead of only 160 pounds. Militarily, that was the equivalent of a single airplane flying over and dropping one small bomb and flying away—terrible for anyone it happened to land on but in the grand scheme of warfare, a mosquito.

 

However the Scud was effective as a terror weapons against civilian populations.” Ever since 1991 this has been the accepted US and Western view of the missile campaign. Kevin Wood now has given us a much different view these attacks, one that has profound implications for missile defense policy and for the way that political leaders have to rethink the instructions they give to the military.

 

Looking back on the German V-2 campaign against London and Antwerp that went on from September 1944 until April 1945, the greatest military effect was not the physical and psychological damage done to England and Belgium, but the impact on Germany’s national morale. One should never forget that these were called Vengeance weapons. For a population suffering under nearly non-stop Allied bombardment and facing defeat on every front, the fact that they were in some small way able to keep hitting back with a wonder weapon that their enemies could not match was a factor keeping them fighting. Nazi propaganda did not fail to manipulate these feelings.

 

Ba’athist Iraq’s war-weary population was likewise subject to massive and—let’s face it—masterful propaganda. Hitting the hated Israelis, even with ineffective weapons, and the fact that due to US political pressure the Israelis did not strike back, was seen by Iraqis and by other Arabs as a great victory. A claim made explicit in a memoir written by Saddam’s missile force commander Hazim Abd al-Razzaq al-Ayyubi Forty-Three Missiles on the Zionist Enemy published in Amman, Jordan in 1998.

 

Al-Ayyubi described how, in the years and months leading up to the war, his two missile brigades practiced their “shoot and scoot” operational techniques. He also wrote about the very serious efforts the Iraqis made building multiple secure communications links using both radio and phone lines. According to a report to Saddam, they started the war with 230 missiles and 75 “special” warheads. Interestingly, he also bragged about the success of his deception units, not only in fooling US and Coalition targeting efforts, but also in deceiving the UN inspectors who tried to account for the missiles. Wood makes it clear “that despite the cost to the Iraqi people, Iraq’s successful violation of UNSC [United Nations Security Council] resolution 687 was a source of great pride to its leaders.”

 

Most, but not all, of what the Iraqis believed they had accomplished with their attacks was nonsense. The claims that they hit Ben Gurion Airport and the Ministry of Defense in Tel Aviv, or the Haifa Technology Institute, are just not serious. As was their claim to have been “the first Arab country to conduct effective offensive operations against the enemy (Israel).” What is true is that these attacks “fulfilled the Iraqi President’s vow that he would retaliate against Israel as revenge for their attacks against the Iraqi reactor.”

 

It is exactly this need for revenge that should get the attention of those in the US government who are trying to design a realistic missile defense policy for the next fifty years. Tyrannical regimes and terrorist movements share the need to excite people with dramatic and violent events. The more spectacular the attack, the better. Firing long-range missiles at an enemy, even if you only hit an empty parking lot, can provide followers with a level of emotional satisfaction. This in turn can motivate them to continue to fight even in a seemingly hopeless battle.

 

In future wars, those who are fighting against the West—today Iran or North Korea, tomorrow, who knows?—will use ballistic missiles not only to terrorize enemy civilian populations but to build morale among their own forces and people. Missile defense is the key to winning this critical psychological battle. As long as their missiles are being shot out of the sky, claims that they are hurting the enemy and thus filling people’s need for revenge can be shown to be utterly empty.

 

Missile defense is the key to winning this critical psychological battle. As long as their missiles are being shot out of the sky, claims that they are hurting the enemy and thus filling people’s need for revenge can be shown to be utterly empty.

This, however, cannot be done with terminal phase defense weapons. To hit a missile or a warhead that is descending towards its target may be a feat of technological skill, but it does nothing to decrease the emotional satisfaction that comes from striking a hated enemy. Midcourse interceptors such as the US GBI or the Israeli Arrow are better, but the best way to publicly humiliate those who are launching Scud-type missiles is to shoot them down as soon after they leave the launch pad as possible. The only weapon now in development that will—in theory—be able to do this is the Airborne Laser (ABL), which the Missile Defense Agency plans to test next year.

This is indeed a promising system, but it has its limits. Its range is, according to unclassified reports, about 300 kilometers, and the US only plans to build, at most, seven aircraft. If the goal is to prevent the enemy from using its missile attacks to build its own side’s morale and thus lengthen the war, another solution must be found.

 

Space-based interceptors, such as a new version of the Brilliant Pebbles program that was canceled in 1993, could, in combination with space- and ground-based sensors, knock down missiles of this type in the boost phase. Significantly, they would do so over the launching country’s own territory and at least some of the citizens would witness the destruction of their leader’s vengeance weapons. This news would spread through word of mouth. This might be one of the keys to undermining their will to make war and help shorten the conflict.

 


Rússia: Medvedev ameaça responder militarmente ao escudo antimíssil EUA na Europa

Agosto 27, 2008

Vera Gomes

Moscovo, 26 Ago (Lusa) - O presidente russo, Dmitri Mdvedev, advertiu hoje que o seu país pode responder com meios militares ao escudo antimíssil norte-americano na Europa, segundo a agência noticiosa RIA-Novosti.

 

Medvedev sustenta que a instalação de um sistema antimíssil próximo das fronteiras russas "irá criar, evidentemente, tensões adicionais".

 

"Temos de reagir de uma maneira ou doutra, reagir, evidentemente, de uma forma militar", disse hoje Mdvedev citado pela RIA-Novosti.

 

As autoridades russas já tinham advertido para uma resposta militar aos planos norte-americanos mas esta declaração do líder russo é susceptível de agravar ainda mais as já tensas relações com o Ocidente.

 

A ameaça surge depois de Medvedev ter reconhecido duas regiões pró-russas como nações independentes, o que foi prontamente criticado pelos Estados Unidos e Europa.

 

 

Lusa/Fim

 

in: noticias sapo

European missile defense and military space

Agosto 25, 2008

Vera Gomes

by Taylor Dinerman
Monday, August 25, 2008

 

The August 20th agreement for the stationing of US Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) in Poland in order to deter or destroy Iranian long-range missiles aimed at Europe or the US was without doubt the direct result of Russia’s invasion of Georgia. From a political standpoint Poland wanted to send both Moscow and Washington an unmistakable signal as to which side they were on, even if it involved making a less-than-optimal deal from Warsaw’s point of view. Now that the agreement has been signed, the US should act generously and give Poland far more support than the US is required to. Also, NATO will have to pay far greater attention to the missile defense issue than it has in the past.

 

In exchange for stationing a mere ten GBIs in Poland, the US has agreed to also place a single battery of PAC-3 Patriot short-range air defense and anti-ballistic missiles on Polish soil. This is far less than Poland truly needs in order to give it a reasonable level or protection against an angry and resentful Russia. This battery is symbolically important, but the Poles need more than a mere symbol.

 

Russia has thousands of tactical and tactical/operational nuclear weapons mounted on ballistic missiles. Ostensibly these are no longer aimed at anyone in particular, but that may not matter much to the Poles or to others in Central and Eastern Europe who once again feel themselves threatened by Russia. These nations have little faith that they can count on their fellow members of the European Union to stand by them in an emergency, so they naturally turn to the US and to NATO for support.

 

It would be a mistake for leaders in Washington to simply see these nations as a place to park a few interceptors. At the same time as the missile defense deal was signed, the US and Poland also signed a Declaration of Strategic Cooperation. This has the potential to be the basis for a new and enlarged set of joint scientific and technological programs with Poland.

 

The Poles have traditionally been a highly scientifically literate people. Copernicus was just the first and best-known Polish scientist. Today there are hundreds of well-trained men and women in that country and elsewhere in the region who are ready to contribute to any number of strategically significant research programs including ones involving missile defense technology. Perhaps some of the Nunn-Lugar money the US has been spending to employ Russian scientists and engineers on projects supposedly intended to keep them from being employed by Iran or other rogue states could be diverted to support researchers in these nations.

 

There is also the open question as to how Poland’s missile defense system will be integrated with the US one. Will Poland, like Japan and Israel, have access on a limited basis to data from the Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites and from the Space Based Infrared (SBIRS) ones that are replacing them? Already the US system is using the large radar arrays in the UK and in Greenland at Thule. The new radar in the Czech Republic may be useful for more than simply tracking missiles from the Middle East.

 

President Sarkozy’s hope for a new European military space force may be an unexpected casualty of Russia’s invasion of Georgia.

Russia has given many of America’s allies, and would-be allies, new reasons to want to integrate their systems with those of the US. The Ukraine has already offered the use of a large former Soviet radar. This would not be of any use in tracking missiles launched from Russia, but would be useful in keep watch over the Mediterranean. It will be interesting to see if France agrees to provide data from the new radar they are planning to build to a NATO early warning system.

 

With a few years Poland and NATO may need to revise the warning and tracking system. A new tactical air defense and missile defense system known as MEADS (Medium Air Defense System) is being built by a joint venture of the US, Germany, and Italy. This system, which uses the PAC-3 missile, might be something that Poland and its neighbors might be interested in procuring. As a multinational program it might be easier to integrate new partners into this program than into a purely American one. It might also make a new NATO missile defense effort more palatable to the Europeans.

 

President Sarkozy’s hope for a new European military space force may be an unexpected casualty of Russia’s invasion of Georgia. The new “Euro DSP” satellites he wants to build may come on line sooner rather than later, but they may be NATO assets rather than EU ones. Poland and the other former Warsaw Pact states may now insist that if Europe is going to build a new set of military space systems that these are built with their requirements in mind. And they may be ready to invest in ones that support the Western Alliance as a whole.

 

Circumstances will force the new US president to take a hard look at the missile defense architecture that Clinton and Bush administrations have put in place. The technology is being developed, tested, and fielded in a slow methodical manner, well-suited to the post-1989 environment. That world is no more. An unhappy change is upon us and America and its allies will have to make some painful adaptations.

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